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I. INTRODUCTION
In July 1986, the Hunt Brothers of Dallas, Texas, weakened by losses
in the silver and oil markets, defaulted on a $1.5 billion loan. The Hunts
then filed a $3.6 billion lawsuit against their lenders on theories, among
others, of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and
duty of good faith, breach of contract, and violations of the antitrust laws
and the Bank Holding Company Act.' Ten years ago, the Hunt's action
would have been wholly unprecedented, with virtually no probability of
success. However, developments in the law since that time, in particular
the emergence of the booming area of lender liability, have dramatically
changed the conventional understanding of the relationship between lend-
ers and their borrowers.
In recent years banks have been subjected to liability in a number of
diverse situations. State National Bank of El Paso v. Farah Manufactur-
ing Co.2 is illustrative. William Farah was chief executive officer of
FMC, a clothing company. From 1972-76, the company incurred large
losses, and William Farah was subsequently replaced as CEO. In 1977,
FMC and its three banks amended their outstanding loan agreements to
provide that any change in FMC's top management considered by any of
the banks to be adverse to their interests would constitute an act of de-
fault. The purpose of the management change clause was to prevent
Farah from returning as CEO.
Shortly thereafter, however, Farah sought reinstatement as CEO. The
board of directors refused after the lenders took the position that Farah's
return would constitute a default under the management change clause.
Approximately one year later, FMC and the banks restructured the loan
and deleted the management change clause-Farah subsequently regained
control of the company. Under Farah's leadership, FMC's fortunes
changed dramatically for the better, and the company regained
profitability.
t Lee and Brena Freeman Professor of Law; Professor of Law and Business, University of Chi-
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1. See Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Penrod Banks' Renewed Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 5, Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co. (No. 3-86-1684G) (N.D. Tex.). The
case was eventually settled.
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FMC then commenced litigation against its lenders. FMC alleged that
the lenders had not intended to declare a default but nevertheless blocked
Farah's return, and that this action constituted fraud, duress, and interfer-
ence with business relations. The jury agreed, awarding approximately
$19 million to FMC. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed.
K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.3 is another leading lender liability case.
In 1979, Irving Trust and K.M.C., a wholesale and retail grocery busi-
ness, entered into a financing agreement that provided K.M.C. with a line
of credit to a maximum of $3.0 million, later increased to $3.5 million. In
exchange, Irving received a security interest in all of K.M.C.'s accounts
receivable and inventory, and K.M.C. was obligated to deposit its receipts
in a "blocked account" controlled by Irving. The financing agreement fur-
ther provided that all advances by Irving under the line of credit were
discretionary and that the outstanding loans were payable on demand.
Subject to this limitation, K.M.C. could draw on the line of credit under a
formula based on a percentage of the value of its inventory and eligible
receivables.
On March 1, 1982, K.M.C. requested an $800,000 advance, which if
given would have raised the outstanding balance to just under $3.5 mil-
lion. Irving refused at first, but on March 4, just three days later, Irving
agreed to advance an additional $700,000. K.M.C.'s business soon col-
lapsed. K.M.C. subsequently sued Irving, claiming that Irving's refusal to
advance the requested funds on March 1 without prior notice constituted
a breach of the duty of good faith, and that this refusal ultimately caused
K.M.C.'s demise. The jury agreed and awarded $7.5 million to K.M.C.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Irving should have given K.M.C.
notice before refusing to advance additional funds on March 1. The Sixth
Circuit further stated that a lender's ability to demand repayment is sub-
ject to a good faith limitation.5
In an increasing number of other well-publicized trials, juries-and oc-
casionally courts in non-jury trials-have awarded borrowers staggering
amounts in lender liability suits against banks.6 While some of these ver-
dicts have been reversed on appeal,7 the basis for reversal in these cases
3. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
4. Id. at 759.
5. Id. at 760.
6. For examples of some of the major awards against banks in lender liability cases, see Conlan v.
Wells Fargo (No. 82852) (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. June 10, 1987) (jury award to borrower of $10
million in compensatory damages and $50 million in punitive damages); Jewell v. Bank of America,
(No. 112439) (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1986) (jury award of $19 in compensatory damages and
$27 million in punitive damages); FDIC v. Scharenberg (Nos. 84-2712, 87-0211, 87-0238) (S.D. Fla.
April 29, 1987) ($105 million in compensatory damages); and Penthouse Int'l v. Dominion Fed. Say.
& Loan Assoc. (No. 84-Civ. 4325) (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1987) (amended opinion July 30, 1987) (court
in bench trial awarded $130 million); Robinson v. McAllen State Bank (No. C-1948-84-D) (Tex.
Dist. Ct. 1987) (verdict of $10 million in compensatory damages and $50 million in punitive
damages).
7. See Penthouse Int'l v. Dominion Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 855 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988) (dam-
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has been limited to the facts of each case. The area of lender liability
remains a booming area of intense concern to lenders and students of com-
mercial law.'
Lender liability cases have led to the creation of an area of commercial
law that has not been accompanied by the development of a coherent theo-
retical framework establishing the rights of lenders and their duties to
their borrowers. 9 For example, what is the purpose of contractual provi-
sions included in loan agreements and who benefits from these provisions?
And to what extent do concepts like good faith and fiduciary duty, fre-
quently discussed in lender liability cases, supplement or override contrac-
tual provisions in loan agreements? The cases and commentary in the
lender liability area provide no satisfactory answers to these questions.
The subject of damages is also in serious need of attention. Many
lender liability cases involve awards of compensatory damages far in ex-
cess of the loan in question. Punitive damages are also awarded fre-
quently. These awards present a conundrum. Borrowing does not create
wealth: If I borrow $100 at the market rate of interest, I am no wealthier
than I was before. Under what circumstances, then, can the failure of a
bank to lend $100 result in any compensatory damages, let alone damages
in excess of $100? And what are the consequences of increasing whatever
the compensatory damages are by an award of punitive damages?
Until some basis exists for answering these questions, the area of lender
liability will remain hopelessly muddled. The purpose of this essay is to
use principles of economics to illuminate these murky issues.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF THE LENDER-BORROWER RELATIONSHIP
A. Exogenous Events, Debtor Misbehavior and the Problem of Default
Risk
Every lender, when deciding whether to make a loan and on what
terms that loan should be made, must assess the probability that a partic-
ular borrower will default. The likely recovery in the event of default
age verdict reversed because evidence did not establish that lender had contractual obligation to lend);
Kruse v. Bank of America, 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1988) (damage verdict reversed
because evidence did not establish that lender engaged in fraud or breached contract to lend).
8. See, e.g., Lender Liability Litigation 1988. Recent Developments 14-40 (PLI Commercial
Law & Practice Handbook No. 468, Order No. A4-4238); Ebke & Griffin, Lender Liability to Debt-
ors: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 Sw. L.J. 775 (1986); Special Project Note, Lenders Lia-
bility, 42 VAND. L. REv. 853 (1989); Note, The Growth of Lender Liability: An Economic Perspec-
tive, 21 GA. L. REV. 723 (1987); Note, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.: Discretionary Financing
and the Implied Duty of Good Faith, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 539 (1987); Comment, What's So Good
about Good Faith: The Good Faith Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1335 (1988).
9. For illustrative leading articles analyzing the debtor-creditor relationship in other contexts, see,
e.g., Schwartz, The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer Goods, 26 J.L. & EcON. 117
(1983); Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 CoLuM. L. REV. 730
(1989).
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must also be assessed. While these matters are of critical importance, the
ability of the lender to make correct assessments is severely limited, no
matter how diligent the lender may be. The reason for this difficulty is
that events after the loan is made will affect the probability of default and
the likelihood of recovery if default occurs. These events are of two gen-
eral types: (1) exogenous events; and (2) debtor misbehavior.
The effect of exogenous events such as dramatic changes in market or
industry conditions (i.e., a recession or a sharp decline in the price of oil)
is clear. These events can significantly affect the probability of default and
the likely recovery if a default occurs.
The effect of debtor misbehavior is also straightforward. Debtors have
an incentive to engage in several types of misbehavior once a loan has
been made:' °
(1) Asset withdrawal. Once a lender contributes capital to a firm, the
borrower has an incentive to withdraw assets from the firm by, for exam-
ple, declaring a dividend for the amount of the loan. This harmful incen-
tive structure is exacerbated in situations involving extensions of credit to
firms with limited liability;1
(2) Risky investment policy. The existence of debt creates an incentive
for borrowers to invest in riskier projects. This incentive arises because
the lender bears the downside risk if the project turns out poorly, but he
does not share in the upside potential if the project turns out well. In
other words, before the loan was made, the borrower bore the costs of
risky investments that failed; now these costs are shared with the lender.
Before and after the extension of credit, however, the borrower alone ob-
tains the benefit from risky investments that succeed.
This incentive to invest in risky projects is a direct function of the
amount the borrower has at risk-the size of the equity cushion. In the
extreme case in which the value of the firm equals the value of outstand-
ing debt, the firm has nothing to lose and everything to gain by adopting a
"shoot the moon" investment strategy;
(3) Claim dilution. The value of debt is a function, inter alia, of the
amount of other debt. The greater the amount of debt of the same or
higher seniority, the lower the value of debt. Thus a borrower can reduce
the value of outstanding debt by issuing more debt and thereby diluting
the claims of existing creditors; and
(4) Underinvestment. The creation of debt imposes an additional claim-
ant on the firm's income stream. This additional claim can result in the
10. For a discussion of the conflict of interest between equity claimants and borrowers and the
contractual mechanisms for minimizing the problem, see Smith & Warner, On Financial Con-
tracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. EcON. 117 (1979); see also Jensen & Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976).
11. For an analysis of the incentives created by limited liability, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Lim-
ited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CH. L. REv. 89 (1985).
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borrower failing to invest in a profitable investment project if too much of
the benefit from the project will accrue to the lender. In this event, the
value of outstanding debt will again be reduced because of the borrower's
actions.
At first blush, the two types of events that can adversely affect lenders
after credit has been extended-exogenous events and debtor misbehav-
ior-seem completely unrelated. In reality, however, there is a close rela-
tionship between the two. As exogenous events adversely affect the bor-
rower, the probability of debtor misbehavior increases. This point can best
be illustrated by a simple numerical example: Consider a hypothetical
company with capital of $200, consisting of equal $100 contributions of
debt and equity. Now assume that the company suffers a $100 decline in
value as a result of a recession. The remaining $100 of value is just
enough to pay off the lender.
Although debtor misbehavior did not cause the $100 decline in value,
this decline will have a profound effect on the borrower's incentives. For
example, as discussed above, the borrower's incentive to invest in risky
projects increases as the value of the debt falls, because the borrower now
has less of its own funds at risk. Returning to the example, the borrower
would not have been likely to have accepted a project with a negative net
present value of less than $100 when the firm was worth $200 because
the borrower would bear the loss. However, once the value of the firm has
fallen to $100, the borrower might be willing to invest in a project with
some upside potential even if its expected value is negative because the
loss is borne by the lender. Furthermore, if the value of the firm falls
below $100, the borrower may even reject some positive net present value
projects due to the underinvestment problem. Because the benefits of the
investment in this situation go to the lender, the borrower has no incentive
to proceed.
Similarly, the probability that the declaration of a dividend or an in-
crease in the amount of outstanding debt will hurt existing creditors is a
function of the value of the borrower not represented by debt. The lower
the equity cushion, the greater the probability that these actions will harm
existing creditors. Thus, if the equity cushion is eroded or eliminated en-
tirely, as in the above example by adverse market or industry develop-
ments, actions such as withdrawal of assets will impose greater harm on
existing creditors.
B. The Role of Monitoring and Bonding
The ability of borrowers to take actions adverse to lenders after a loan
has been made does not mean that borrowers can victimize lenders. On
the contrary, lenders anticipate the various forms of debtor misbehavior
and factor them into their decisions of whether and on what terms to lend.
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The greater the amount of anticipated debtor misconduct, the greater the
compensation (i.e., the higher interest rate) that a lender will demand.
To decrease the amount of compensation demanded, borrowers will at-
tempt to allay lenders' concerns by agreeing to various monitoring and
bonding mechanisms.12 An illustration of a monitoring mechanism is an
agreement whereby the borrower promises to provide the lender with pe-
riodic financial information so that the lender can make more informed
decisions. Examples of bonding mechanisms include the provision of per-
sonal guarantees and/or security for the loan, as well as various types of
loan covenants limiting the discretion of the borrower.
Some loan covenants are very specific in the sense that they refer to
particular behavior by the debtor; covenants establishing the circumstances
when dividends can be paid and the provision at issue in Farah prohibit-
ing a management change without consent of the lender are examples of
this type. Other covenants, like the ones at issue in K.M.C., are very gen-
eral. There, the relevant covenants in a letter of credit agreement gave the
lender sole discretion whether to continue to lend and the ability to call
amounts outstanding as immediately due and payable.
It is important to understand that these bonding mechanisms limiting
the discretion of the borrower are not "unfair" to the borrower in any
meaningful sense." The opposite is true, because the borrower obtains
credit on more advantageous terms as a result of the protections afforded
the lender by the loan covenants. Unconscionability is rarely a serious
concern in multi-million dollar commercial loan transactions. Moreover,
the borrower always has the option of not borrowing or of obtaining fi-
nancing elsewhere. Credit markets are intensely competitive; alternative
sources of credit abound. Thus the willingness of the borrower to go for-
ward with a transaction which includes loan covenants is strong, perhaps
dispositive, evidence that the borrower believes he will benefit from the
covenants relative to his alternatives.
Thus in Farah, the lender apparently concluded that the default risk
would be increased if Farah regained control and therefore the bank in-
sisted on including a management change clause as part of the agreement.
While the management change clause ostensibly protected the lender, it
also benefitted the borrower by reducing the compensation demanded by
the lender.
The analysis of the loan covenants at issue in K.M.C. is similar to the
analysis of Farah, but it is less intuitively clear because of the total discre-
tion vested in the lender. Why would any borrower agree to such provi-
sions which on their face give the lender sole discretion over whether to
12. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10.
13. For a similar analysis of monitoring and bonding mechanisms in the context of franchise
agreements, see Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, 70
AM. ECON. REv. 356 (May, 1980).
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lend and whether to call the outstanding amount? The reason is that the
costs of writing and enforcing contracts make it impossible to deter all
forms of debtor misbehavior in the initial agreement.14 Therefore, to avoid
prohibitively expensive contract terms and gain more favorable interest
rates, borrowers are willing to concede such provisions to lenders.
Consider the situation when the parties want to negotiate a letter of
credit agreement under which the borrower can request funds over several
years. One way to structure the agreement would be to allow the bor-
rower an unconditional right to demand funds at any time throughout the
duration of the agreement under terms fixed at the outset. The difficulty
is that this arrangement subjects the lender to the risk of subsequent
debtor misbehavior and/or exogenous events that increase default risk.
A second possibility that provides some protection to the lender (and
which therefore decreases the compensation the lender will demand) is for
the letter of credit agreement to state specifically when the lender is obli-
gated to advance funds. This arrangement will not be entirely satisfactory
either, however, because it is difficult to specify in advance an appropriate
response by the lender to all future contingencies. One partial solution to
this problem is to include in the agreement general language requiring the
lender to lend unless there is a material adverse change in the condition of
the borrower. But this solution creates problems of its own because dis-
putes may arise concerning what constitutes a "material adverse change"
and because some third party such as a court must be the ultimate arbiter.
Still another solution to the "cost of contracting" problem, the one cho-
sen by the parties in K.M.C., is to structure the agreement so that the
lender controls whether to lend and the length of time amounts advanced
will remain outstanding (the ability to call the loan). The lender in
K.M.C. was further protected by the "blocked account" mechanism which
denied the borrower access to the funds that provided security for the
loan. While these provisions impose costs of their own,"5 they do protect
the lender from increased default risk resulting from debtor misbehavior
and/or exogenous events. Borrowers also benefit from such provisions be-
cause the compensation lenders demand for bearing default risk is re-
duced. Further, such provisions enable borrowers who are confident about
their prospects to signal their beliefs to lenders and thus to borrow on
more attractive terms than borrowers who are less optimistic.
14. For a general discussion of contractual adaptations when the costs of writing and enforcing
contracts make it impossible to cover all contingencies that may arise, see Goetz & Scott, Principles of
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981). See also Klein, supra note 13.
15. See infra pp. 138-140.
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C. The Problem of Lender Misbehavior
Thus far I have emphasized how the problem of debtor misbehavior
creates an incentive for borrowers to enter into various monitoring and
bonding mechanisms in order to obtain credit on more favorable terms. It
would be a mistake, however, to assume that these monitoring and bond-
ing mechanisms operate costlessly.
Monitoring and bonding mechanisms impose several types of costs that
limit their use. The first type is direct cost-the cost, for example, of di-
rect audits. The fact that audits are costly ensures they will be conducted
periodically rather than continuously. A second type of cost is opportunity
cost, the benefit foregone from restrictions on the borrower's discretion.
The management change clause in Farah, for example, limited the bor-
rower's flexibility to implement wealth increasing changes of the manage-
ment team. Other types of restrictions, particularly restrictions on invest-
ment policy, are costly for the same reason, and therefore should be used
economically.
A third, and for my purposes most important, cost of monitoring and
bonding mechanisms is the incentive they create for the lender to misbe-
have by acting opportunistically. Opportunistic behavior occurs whenever
one party attempts to obtain, at the expense of the other, a benefit not
contemplated by the initial agreement, either explicitly or implicitly. 6
Thus, whenever a lender attempts to renegotiate with the borrower for
better terms when there is no basis for doing so, the lender is behaving
opportunistically.
Three factors limit the ability of the lender to behave opportunistically
to extract additional concessions from the borrower. First, if the lender's
actions constitute a breach of contract, the lender can be forced to pay
damages. Second, the lender must be concerned about the effect of oppor-
tunistic behavior on its reputation. Most lenders are typically larger than
borrowers and more likely to be repeat players. Reputation will be a more
effective deterrent to lender misbehavior, therefore, than to debtor misbe-
havior.17 Finally, the market for substitute performance or, more specifi-
cally, the availability of other sources of credit, limits lenders' ability to
extract concessions from debtors. The size of any concessions must be
smaller than the costs to the debtor of negotiating with a new lender. 8
While these three factors weaken the incentive for a lender to behave
opportunistically, they do not eliminate it altogether. Not all attempts to
16. For a thorough analysis of the problem of opportunistic behavior, see Muris, Opportunistic
Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1981).
17. For a similar argument that reputation deters opportunistic behavior by employers who also
tend to be repeat players and larger than employees, see Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will,
51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947, 967-68 (1984).
18. See infra pp. 138-140 (discussing how ability of new lender in bankruptcy to obtain superpri-
ority also limits ability of lender to behave opportunistically).
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behave opportunistically will constitute breaches; many will be more sub-
tle. Nor is reputation a complete answer since actions by the lender will
often prove ambiguous in their justification. It will frequently be difficult,
in other words, for future borrowers to draw inferences from lenders' past
actions. Further, reputation will be a weak deterrent for lenders who do
not intend to transact in the future. Finally, the availability of alternative
sources of credit is also not a complete solution. Since there are always
some costs associated with negotiating with a new lender, the lender has
some range in which to extract concessions.
There are two situations in which this range might be quite large be-
cause the costs to the borrower of negotiating with a new lender are high.
The first concerns the occurrence of a change in exogenous events which
alters the economics of the credit relationship where the risk of such
change was initially allocated to the lender. For example, in a situation
involving a fixed rate loan in which interest rates have risen dramatically,
the lender has a strong incentive to repudiate the initial allocation of risks
and renegotiate. The availability of other sources of credit provides limited
comfort to the borrower since any new agreement will reflect the in-
creased rate of interest.
The second situation in which the costs to the borrower of negotiating
with a new lender may be high arises when the relationship between the
initial lender and the borrower has become highly specialized over time. If
the lender has acquired a great deal of costly information about the partic-
ular borrower and its prospects, it can loan on more advantageous terms
than other lenders who are less informed. The advantage of the first
lender will be even greater if the borrower is faced with time immediacy.
Assume, for example, that a lender with specialized knowledge knows that
a particular borrower plans to use the proceeds of a loan to purchase a
unique asset on a certain date. The lender can then threaten not to lend
the money unless the borrower renegotiates the terms of the loan, knowing
that it will be very difficult for the borrower to obtain a new source of
credit in time to purchase the unique asset.
Thus, it will be profitable in certain circumstances for a lender to be-
have opportunistically. Indeed, the probability of opportunistic behavior
by lenders is increased by the presence of the very monitoring and bond-
ing mechanisms designed to limit debtor misbehavior. The most obvious
case in which this will be true is the situation (as in K.M.C.) where the
agreement provides the lender with sole discretion to refuse to lend and to
declare amounts outstanding immediately due and payable whether or not
the debtor has misbehaved or is likely to do so in the future. Loan cove-
nants that require the borrower to take certain actions and to refrain from
others also increase the probability of opportunistic behavior by lenders.
The number of such covenants will be larger as the ability of the lender to
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declare a technical default for the purpose of extracting concessions from
the debtor expands.
Whether the increased risk of lender misbehavior created by loan cove-
nants imposes costs that outweigh the benefits from limiting debtor misbe-
havior cannot be resolved at a theoretical level. The answer will vary de-
pending on the situation and particular covenant involved. The most that
can be said is that when such covenants are present, the parties must have
concluded at the time of the initial agreement that the gains from deter-
ring debtor misbehavior outweighed the costs from increasing the
probability of lender misbehavior.
III. CONTRACT LAW, THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH, AND FIDUCIARY
DUTIES
Courts faced with a lender liability case must decide whether the chal-
lenged conduct of the lender was consistent with the agreement between
the parties. This inquiry is primarily a matter of contract interpretation.
What remains unclear, however, is whether courts should look beyond the
contract itself and the usual tools of contract interpretation to some other
body of authority in order to define the rights and duties between the
parties. This question is important because borrowers in recent lender lia-
bility cases have argued that lenders' conduct violated the duty of good
faith and fiduciary duties to the borrower. However, precisely what these
concepts mean and what their relationship is to contract law is not clearly
understood.
A. The Duty of Good Faith
The doctrine of good faith has a long history in contract law. Section 1-
203 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that "[e]very contract or
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance
or enforcement."1 Similarly, Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts states that a duty of good faith should be imposed in all
contracts.20
However, notwithstanding the extensive literature on the subject,2 no
consensus exists on precisely what the duty of good faith means. At one
extreme, some commentators have argued that the duty should be limited
19. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1988).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
21. See, e.g., Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith,
94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980); Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonable-
ness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHi. L. REV. 666 (1963); Gillette, Limitations on
the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE LJ. 619; Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract
Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv'. 195 (1968); Com-
ment, What's So Good About Good Faith? The Good Faith Performance Obligation in Commercial
Lending, 55 U. CH. L. REv. 1335 (1988).
[Vol. 99: 131
Lender Liability
to a prohibition of intentional dishonesty.22 Under this view, the duty of
good faith adds little to the prohibition against fraud other than a vague
exhortation for moral behavior. At the other extreme, several commenta-
tors have concluded that good faith should be interpreted expansively to
incorporate community standards of fairness and decency. 3 The obvious
difficulty with this position is the lack of any accepted understanding of
the meaning of these terms. Moreover, this lack of content creates an
added risk that the fairness and decency standard will be applied arbitrar-
ily to the detriment of lenders and borrowers alike. For example, a bor-
rower-plaintiff might be able to invalidate default provisions used by bor-
rowers to obtain more favorable credit terms on the grounds that they are
"unfair," but this act would ultimately hurt borrowers as a class by rais-
ing the cost of credit.
An intermediate position is to interpret the duty of good faith as
equivalent to a prohibition of opportunistic behavior.24 Under this view,
lenders are entitled to the benefit of their bargain but are precluded from
using contractual terms as a pretense for extracting benefits for which
they have not bargained. For example, a lender such as the one in
K.M.C.25 could terminate funding if the default risk increased, but, absent
a risk increase, the duty of good faith would prevent the same lender from
threatening to terminate funding in order to force the borrower to pay a
higher interest rate.
Once again, the rationale for imposing a duty of good faith on lenders
relates to the impossibility of drafting a contract covering every possible
contingency. If contracts could be negotiated and enforced without any
cost, the parties could negotiate an agreement which would preclude at-
tempts by the lender to behave opportunistically. Because of the costs of
negotiating and enforcing agreements, however, the parties cannot prevent
all opportunistic behavior by contract. Thus the duty of good faith acts as
an implied contractual term to achieve what the parties themselves cannot
given the costs involved.
While this interpretation of the duty of good faith has a certain appeal,
it is not without difficulty. The problem is that distinguishing opportunis-
tic from non-opportunistic behavior can be very complicated if not impos-
sible." A lender will never concede that its actions were designed to ob-
tain a benefit not bargained for in the initial agreement. On the contrary,
22. See Gillette, supra note 21.
23. See Summers, supra note 21.
24. This interpretation of the duty of good faith is suggested in Muris, supra note 16. See also
Goetz & Scott, supra note 14.
25. See supra text accompanying note 3.
26. The problem of distinguishing non-opportunistic exercise of contractual rights from opportu-
nistic behavior is pervasive in the law of contracts. See, e.g., Aivazian, Trebilcock & Penny, The Law
of Contract Modifications: The Uncertain Quest for a Benchmark of Enforceability, 22 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 173 (1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 271, 297 n.66 (1986); Muris, supra note 16.
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the lender will claim that its refusal to continue funding was based on its
assessment of the debtor and the probability of default. Moreover, not
only will distinguishing between these two explanations be difficult, but
also the attempt to distinguish them will impair the contractual protection
given to the lender in the first instance.
Recall that provisions giving the lender sole discretion whether to con-
tinue funding and to call any amounts outstanding are best understood as
bonding mechanisms used by the borrower to obtain more favorable credit
terms. The strength of the bond, however, is weakened if the borrower
can argue to a court that the exercise of discretion granted to the lender by
the agreement was not done in good faith. This recourse defeats one of the
key features of the bond: that the lender, and not a court, decides whether
to continue the relationship with a particular borrower. On the other
hand, allowing the lender absolute discretion, as discussed above, creates
an incentive for the lender to behave opportunistically.
Thus there is a trade-off. The more absolute the discretion of the
lender, the stronger the bond of the borrower but the greater the incentive
of the lender to behave opportunistically. Conversely, the more expansive
the interpretation of the duty of good faith to control opportunistic behav-
ior by the lender, the weaker is the bond of the borrower and the less able
the borrower is to use the bond to obtain more favorable credit terms.
K.M.C. and Farah demonstrate that courts must be sensitive to this trade-
off when interpreting the duty of good faith.
B. K.M.C., Farah and the Duty of Good Faith
1. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.
K.M.C. illustrates the application of the duty of good faith in lender
liability cases. There the Sixth Circuit held that the duty requires a lender
to provide notice to the borrower before refusing to advance requested
funds under a letter of credit agreement. The court rejected the lender's
claim that this notice requirement was inconsistent with the demand pro-
vision in the agreement between the parties because it found that the
lender's ability to demand repayment of amounts outstanding is limited by
an obligation of good faith performance. Thus the Sixth Circuit concluded
that Irving, the lender, violated its duty of good faith by refusing to ad-
vance requested funds without first providing notice.
The court's imposition of a notice requirement was apparently moti-
vated by a concern that "the literal interpretation of the financing agree-
ment" would leave "K.M.C.'s continued existence entirely at the whim or
mercy of Irving. ... " The rationale for this concern, however, is un-
clear. One possible explanation is that the court believed that the agree-
27. 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 99: 131
Lender Liability
ment as written was unconscionable because it provided the lender with
discretion to refuse to advance funds. This rationale is not very satisfac-
tory, however, because it begs the question of why a presumably sophisti-
cated commercial borrower in a competitive credit market would consent
to such an agreement in the first place. This enigma disappears, however,
once it is understood that the discretion vested in the lender by the agree-
ment is best understood as a bonding device which benefits both the bor-
rower and the lender.
An alternative explanation for the court's interpretation of the duty of
good faith is that a notice requirement is necessary to prevent opportunis-
tic behavior by lenders. Under this interpretation, the court concluded that
the notice requirement was in effect an implied contractual term that the
parties would have agreed to if they had anticipated the situation in
K.M.C. However, this interpretation of the court's holding also has seri-
ous difficulties.
First, it appears to be inconsistent with the actual agreement, which
entrusts the decision whether to continue funding to the lender, not to a
court. Second, under the facts of K.M.C., it is doubtful that the lender's
decision is accurately characterized as opportunistic behavior. According
to the evidence, it was not clear that K.M.C. would have been able to
meet its obligations even had Irving advanced the requested $800,000.8
Moreover, the deteriorating financial condition of the borrower during the
period prior to the date that the lender refused to advance additional
funds was undisputed. As the court stated: "It is plain from the record
that the company was heavily leveraged, its heavy losses in 1981 had
eroded stockholder equity, and it had a substantial amount of uncollectible
receivables in excess of its bad debt reserve." 9 These are precisely the
conditions where, as discussed above, the lender needs protection because
of the increased probability of debtor misbehavior resulting from the re-
duced value of the borrower. Even if a loan is still fully secured (as ap-
parently was the case in K.M.C.30), the rational lender will be concerned
that external events and the debtor's incentive to misbehave (for example,
by investing in overly risky projects), might jeopardize the lender's posi-
tion in the future. The actions of the lender in K.M.C., in short, appear to
have been perfectly consistent with the purpose of the cessation of funding
provision and with the understanding between the parties.
A final difficulty with the notice requirement imposed by the court is
that it encourages opportunistic behavior by borrowers, which is precisely
what the bonding mechanisms in the loan agreement are designed to
avoid. Consider the effect of a notice requirement: Between the time notice
28. Id. at 762.
29. Id. at 766.
30. Id. at 762.
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is given by the lender and the time further advances are cut off, the bor-
rower can request funds up to the full amount provided by the letter of
credit agreement. These funds can then be used to the detriment of the
lender in whatever manner the borrower chooses."1 In effect, the notice
requirement transforms an agreement from one where the lender had sole
discretion over whether to continue funding into one where this discretion
is vested in the borrower. Thus the notice requirement obliterates the
bonding mechanism designed by the parties.
In the final analysis, the court in K.M.C. erred because, in its eagerness
to impose a duty of good faith on lenders, it failed to consider what that
duty means. The duty of good faith is best understood as an implied con-
tractual term designed to deter opportunistic behavior. The notice require-
ment created by the court in K.M.C. cannot be justified under this stan-
dard. The evidence suggests not only that the lender in K.M.C. was not
behaving opportunistically, but also that the notice requirement will have
the reverse effect of encouraging opportunistic behavior by borrowers. As
such, the notice requirement as applied in K.M.C. is inconsistent with the
intent of the parties (and thus the opposite of an implied contractual
term), and will operate to the detriment of both borrowers and lenders.
2. State National Bank of El Paso v. Farah Manufacturing Co.
In Farah, the Texas Court of Appeals held that a lender acted illegally
by threatening to declare an outstanding loan in default pursuant to a
management change clause if William Farah returned as C.E.O. Unlike
the Sixth Circuit in K.M.C., the court in Farah did not explicitly rely on
the duty of good faith to find lender liability. The analysis is nevertheless
similar in both cases because, as in K.M.C., the court in Farah again
concluded that a lender acted illegally even though its action was seem-
ingly authorized by the underlying agreement. The question thus arises
whether the lender in Farah was acting opportunistically by threatening
to exercise its right under the management change clause. As in K.M.C.,
the answer appears to be no.
The situation in Farah was as follows: William Farah became C.E.O.
of FMC in 1964. The company was successful and went public in 1967.
As a result of a strike and other difficulties, however, the company then
experienced serious financial problems. During the period from 1972-76,
FMC experienced a pre-tax loss of approximately $44 million. In July,
1976, Farah was replaced as C.E.O. Seven months later, in February
1977, FMC and several of its lender banks amended a preexisting loan
31. The court in K.M.C. held that Irving had a good faith obligation to provide notice "absent
valid business reasons precluding Irving from doing so." Id. at 759. The court failed to consider the




agreement to include a management change clause. The clause made it
"an event of default" if there occurred "[a]ny change" in the senior man-
agement of FMC that "any two Banks shall consider, for any reason
whatsoever, to be adverse to the interest of the Banks." 2 One month later,
in March 1977, Farah attempted to return as C.E.O., and the banks re-
sisted the change claiming that it would constitute an act of default. The
Texas court deemed this threat by the banks to constitute fraud, duress,
and interference with the debtor's business relations.3
The court in Farah did not understand the purpose of the management
change clause. The clause, like the cessation of funding clause in K.M.C.,
is best understood as a bonding mechanism used by the borrower to obtain
more favorable credit terms. The lenders in Farah attributed the losses
between 1972 and 1976 to Farah. These losses, as emphasized through-
out, had a dual effect-they increased the risk of default and also the
incentive of the debtor to misbehave, thus further increasing default risk.
To allay the lenders' concerns, FMC agreed to the management clause
which gave the banks veto power over Farah's return as C.E.O. and over
any other senior management change; according to the clause, the banks
could exercise their power "for any reason whatsoever." When Farah at-
tempted to return as C.E.O. one month after FMC agreed to the manage-
ment change clause, the banks legitimately protested within the terms of
this agreement.
The court's holding in Farah is indefensible. The lenders were not be-
having opportunistically-that is, they were not trying to extract from the
borrowers a benefit for which they had not originally bargained. On the
contrary, the banks' actions were clearly contemplated by the management
change clause, which was designed for precisely the contingency in which
it was used.
The court tried to escape this conundrum by drawing a distinction be-
tween the use of the clause to declare a default and the use of the clause to
threaten to declare a default. The evidence did not clearly show whether
the lenders had already decided to declare a default if Farah returned or
whether they were merely bluffing. But the distinction emphasized by the
court is unsatisfactory. First, it is not surprising that there was conflicting
evidence as to whether the banks had irrevocably decided to declare an act
of default if Farah returned or whether this was still an open question.
The decision was an important one for the lenders, and need not have
been made final until and unless FMC violated the management change
clause. Since the violation had not yet occurred, the lenders were not re-
quired to reach a final decision.
32. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 667 (emphasis added).
33. The aspect of fraud arose when the borrowers questioned the intention of the lenders even to
follow through with their stated threat to call the loan if Farah was reinstated as C.E.O. Id. at 781.
See infra pp. 131-32.
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Nor is the court correct in suggesting that the lenders did something
wrong by "threatening" to exercise their contractual rights as opposed to
waiting and then declaring an act of default. Imagine that the lenders had
not communicated to FMC their dissatisfaction with Farah's return and
that they had not told FMC that this act would be an event of default
under the management change clause. If Farah had then returned and the
lenders declared the loan in default, the lenders would be liable under the
rationale of K.M.C. for failing to provide notice. Yet, having given notice,
the lenders were accused of fraud and duress. The Catch-22 faced by
lenders confronted with these conflicting legal doctrines is obvious.
In sum, both K.M.C. and Farah were wrongly decided. The lenders in
both cases acted pursuant to contractual provisions best understood as
bonding mechanisms used by borrowers to obtain more favorable credit
terms. The application of the duty of good faith in K.M.C. and the analo-
gous judicial exercise in Farah are misplaced because the lenders in both
cases were not behaving opportunistically. Rather than deterring opportu-
nistic behavior by lenders, both courts simply eviscerated bonding mecha-
nisms that benefit both borrowers and lenders.
C. A Note on Fiduciary Duties
Borrowers in lender liability cases also routinely allege that the actions
of the lender violated a fiduciary duty owed to the borrower. In the Hunt
case, for example, the Hunt brothers alleged that the lenders breached a
fiduciary duty owed to them in seeking to collect outstanding loans.3 This
alleged breach of fiduciary duty, the Hunts claimed, was a defense to the
lenders' attempt to collect the unpaid principal and interest. The district
court in the Hunt case was skeptical that the lenders owed a fiduciary
duty to the Hunts but ruled that the issue was a question of fact not
amenable to summary judgment. Another court has suggested that the re-
lationship between a bank and its loan customers may be "quasi-fiduci-
ary" in character.
35
Imposing a fiduciary duty on lenders is inappropriate in the typical
lender liability case. Fiduciary duties govern agency relationships. An
agency relationship is an agreement in which one or more persons (the
principal[s]) delegate authority to another person (the agent) to perform
some service or task on the principal's behalf. Examples of agency rela-
tionships in commercial contexts include trustees who manage money on
behalf of others and corporate directors. In both cases, fiduciary duties
require the agent to act on behalf of the principal.
34. Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co. (No. 3-86-1684-H) (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 1987) (consolidated
with No. 3-86-2012-H).
35. See Barrett v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16, 20
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1970) (finding
duty of disclosure based on relationship between bank president and borrower).
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The lender-borrower relationship, however, is not analogous to the
principal-agent relationship. In a loan agreement, there is no comparable
delegation whereby one party agrees to act on behalf of the other; thus, no
agency relationship is created. The relationship is more accurately de-
scribed as being at arms-length, where both parties act for themselves
rather than as agents for each other.
Moreover, even if the common understanding of fiduciary duty could
somehow be stretched to encompass lender-borrower relationships, it
would still be necessary to define exactly what conduct was required of
the lender. Optimal fiduciary rules approximate the bargain that the par-
ties would have reached if the costs of contracting were zero.36 Thus, it
would make no sense to interpret fiduciary duties so as to prohibit prac-
tices, such as the bonding mechanisms at issue in K.M.C. and Farah, that
are part of the bargain between borrowers and lenders. To do so would
interpret fiduciary duties in a way that penalizes not only lenders but also
borrowers, who are the supposed beneficiaries. In other words, even if
lenders are deemed to owe a fiduciary duty to borrowers, K.M.C. and
Farah would still be wrongly decided.
IV. DAMAGES IN LENDER LIABILITY CASES
Thus far I have focused on issues of liability in lender liability cases. In
this section I discuss the relevant principles for analyzing damages in
these cases. However, my discussion of damages should not deflect atten-
tion from the main point that it often should not be necessary to reach this
issue if the economics of the lender-borrower relationship are properly
understood. Nevertheless, damage issues are critically important because
the exposure faced by lenders will greatly influence the number of cases
filed and the terms on which cases are resolved.
Damage claims in lender liability cases follow a familiar pattern. A
lender is alleged either to have wrongfully refused to lend, or to have
called, a loan. The borrower then demands huge actual damages based on
lost profits. Juries seem receptive to this demand. In FDIC v.
Scharenberg,3 7 for example, a jury awarded the plaintiff, a real estate
developer, $105 million in actual damages based on the alleged improper
refusal of Continental Illinois to advance $3 million in funds. In the same
case, the plaintiffs requested more than $200 million in punitive damages
based on the same alleged improper refusal by Continental to lend $3
million. While no punitive damages were awarded, juries in other cases
have not felt so restrained. 38
36. For an analysis of fiduciary duties along these lines, see Easterbrook & Fisehel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982).
37. (Nos. 84-2712, 87-0211, 87-0238) (S.D. Fla. April 29, 1987); see supra note 6.
38. See cases cited supra note 6.
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Economic principles can be used to show why damage measures used in
the past have been improperly constructed. I begin this section with a
general discussion of the proper methodology for analyzing damages in
lender liability cases. I then apply this methodology to Farah and K.M.C.
A. General Principles of Contract Damages
The relationship between a lender and a borrower is contractual. In
contracts cases, courts typically apply the expectations measure of dam-
ages once a breach has been found. The goal of the expectations measure
is to place the plaintiff in the same position as if the contract had been
performed. There are, however, several qualifications on this general
statement. One is that under the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale consequen-
tial damages caused by the defendant's breach can be recovered only if
foreseeable.3 9 A second qualification is that damages cannot be recovered
if the plaintiff could have avoided them with reasonable efforts."0
The plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages has particularly important im-
plications in the lender liability context. Consider the situation of a bor-
rower with profitable opportunities who is denied a source of credit. As-
sume the denial of credit is a clear breach by the lender. Under
conventional principles of contract law, the borrower cannot claim the loss
of the profitable opportunities as damages flowing from the breach.
Rather, the duty to mitigate damages requires the borrower to obtain
credit from an alternative source. The borrower's damages should be lim-
ited to the cost of cover (i.e., a higher interest rate and/or the transaction
costs of negotiating another loan).
It is important to emphasize that dollars are not an idiosyncratic good
like a rare painting for which no substitutes exist. On the contrary, dollars
are the most fungible of all commodities. Moreover, a wide array of alter-
native sources of commercial credit exist. Banks, pension funds, insurance
companies, investment partnerships, venture capitalists and others are
seeking at all times to find profitable opportunities for investment. Bro-
kers who serve to match lenders with worthy borrowers advertise rou-
tinely in newspapers and financial publications. It is this widespread
availability of alternative sources of credit which provides the rationale for
limiting borrowers' damages to the costs of cover rather than lost profits.
Borrowers in lender liability cases typically assert that they were una-
ble to obtain alternative sources of credit. What has not been fully appre-
ciated, however, is the fundamental incompatibility between this claim
39. For a discussion of consequential damages and the forseeability rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (QB 1854), see Epstein, Beyond Forseeability: Consequential Damages in the
Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1989).
40. For an economic analysis of the legal rules governing mitigation, see Goetz & Scott, The




and the borrower's simultaneous demand for huge damages to make up
for lost profits. If a business is really that valuable, market participants
would be willing to invest in it-they are leaving money on the table if
they don't. Conversely, if nobody is willing to invest, a strong presumption
arises that the business was not that valuable in the first place.
Returning to the allegations of Scharenberg v. Continental Bank, it is
wholly unrealistic to conclude that Continental and all other economic ac-
tors in the economy would refuse to lend or otherwise invest $3 million in
a venture with potential profits of $100 million, a rate of return in excess
of 3000%. Why should a court believe that there were significant lost
profits when the consensus of market participants, equipped with superior
expertise and every incentive to make the right decision because their
wealth was at stake, concluded the opposite?
B. Complicating Factors: Time Immediacy, the Threat of Bankruptcy
and Transaction-Specific Assets
These simple principles of contract damages will resolve most cases but
not all. Some hard cases will remain. The complexity of some businesses
and the difficulty of establishing a relationship with a new lender may
make it difficult to renegotiate a new loan instantaneously. The time nec-
essary to obtain an alternative source of credit may create difficulties in
situations where time is of the essence.
1. Time Immediacy and The Threat of Bankruptcy
One situation in which time appears to be of the essence is the case
where the borrower needs funds immediately to pay other creditors who
have the power to trigger an involuntary bankruptcy. If creditors trigger
involuntary bankruptcy after a lender refuses to advance additional funds,
the borrower's claim of lost profits may seem more plausible.
But such a claim is still highly suspect. First, the inability of the bor-
rower to have avoided bankruptcy by convincing either existing creditors
to wait before filing or other creditors to advance additional funds suggests
that there are no huge profits to be lost. Second, even if no pre-bankruptcy
solution is negotiated, a credit-worthy debtor should still be able to obtain
financing after bankruptcy is triggered.
It is important to recognize that a firm does not automatically lose its
going concern value even if it is forced into bankruptcy. Bankruptcy does
not cause the borrower's assets and business opportunities to disappear.
On the contrary, the debtor can continue its operations after the filing and
still obtain financing. Indeed, lenders have a strong incentive to finance
bankrupt debtors with sound business opportunities. Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, a lender that finances a bankrupt debtor can get a super
priority whereby prior lenders are subordinated. The availability of the
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super priority for new lenders suggests that bankrupt debtors who have
good investment opportunities can obtain financing. This significantly
lowers the probability that a refusal to extend credit by the first lender
will cause the debtor to lose its going concern value. But there is a more
fundamental effect of the super priority available to new lenders-it de-
ters opportunistic behavior by the initial lender. This effect occurs because
a lender that triggers an involuntary bankruptcy opportunistically may
find its loan subordinated to subsequent lenders. Therefore, the refusal of
the initial lender to extend credit under these circumstances must reflect a
judgment that the debtor is not economically viable.
2. Time Immediacy and Transaction-Specific Assets
The strongest argument for awarding damages in lender liability cases
exists in situations involving transaction-specific assets. Assume a pur-
chaser agrees to purchase an office building for $100 million on a certain
date and arranges to finance the purchase. The purchaser has previously
put up $1 million in earnest money, which it will forfeit if it cannot raise
the $100 million on the day of closing. The lender then defaults and the
purchaser forfeits the $1 million. Since no possibility of cover existed, the
purchaser cannot be faulted for failure to mitigate damages. Unless some
other limitation on damages applies, such as the foreseeability rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale, the purchaser should be able to recover the lost $1
million from the lender.
The $1 million is recoverable in the above example because it is trans-
action-specific; it cannot be recovered by engaging in another transaction.
The question then arises whether the purchaser should be allowed to re-
cover lost profits in addition to the $1 million earnest money. The answer
depends on whether or not the claimed lost profits are as transaction-
specific as the earnest money deposit. A claim might be made that lost
profits should be awarded if the office building was underpriced relative to
other assets. This is an unlikely rationale for awarding lost profits, how-
ever, because the more natural assumption in an arms-length commercial
transaction is that the building is priced so that the purchaser can expect a
competitive rate of return (adjusted for risk)."'
To be sure, the purchaser may have some special expertise that would
produce a greater than competitive rate of return if the building were
purchased. But even in this case, the purchasers with such skills can buy
another office building (few office buildings are truly unique) or attempt
to purchase the initial building after it has been sold to someone else.
41. The extent to which a transaction price should be regarded as the best approximation of the
value of an asset is a function of many factors, including the sophistication of the buyer and seller, the
solicitation of bids in an auction or elsewhere, and the information available to market participants.
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Thus, profits attributable to special skills will likely be earned whether or
not the office building is sold to another purchaser.
If the claimed lost profits resulting from failure to purchase the office
building are equally available from the purchase of another office build-
ing, then the lost profits are not transaction-specific and should not be
recoverable. Damages should be limited to the cost of cover-any increase
in cost incurred by the purchasers (for example, as a result of rising com-
mercial real estate values) because of the breach by the lender.
C. The Effects of Damage Windfalls
The preceding discussion demonstrates that huge damage awards based
on lost profits should not routinely be awarded in lender liability cases. In
the absence of time immediacy and transaction-specific assets, such awards
cannot place the plaintiff in the same position as though the contract had
been performed-the goal of the expectation measure of damages. On the
contrary, such awards provide the plaintiff with a windfall, making the
borrower better off than if no breach had occurred. In addition, an award
of punitive damages exacerbates the situation by increasing the size of the
windfall even more.
While a particular borrower-plaintiff may benefit from the receipt of
such a windfall, borrowers as a class will not. Windfall damage awards
create perverse incentives. Since the borrower is better off if the contract is
breached than if it is performed (i.e., the expected return in the form of
damages exceeds the expected return from the investment), the borrower
has an incentive to induce a breach. Similarly, the prospect of a windfall
damage award makes the lender reluctant to enforce its contractual rights
in response to misbehavior by the borrower.42 In sum, windfall damage
awards will result in an increase in the amount of debtor misbehavior and
a decrease in the protections available to the lender.
Lenders, however, will not bear this increased risk of debtor misbehav-
ior without compensation. If lenders cannot protect themselves by contract
from debtor misbehavior, they will charge higher interest rates, to the det-
riment of borrowers as a class. The impact will be borne disproportion-
ately by high-risk borrowers, such as those with no significant credit his-
tory, because bonding mechanisms are likely to be particularly important
for this class of borrowers. But if the prospect of huge damage awards
eviscerates bonding mechanisms insofar as the borrower can no longer
credibly commit to give the lender discretion to discontinue funding, high
risk borrowers have less ability to allay lenders' concerns. These borrow-
ers will then have to shift to some alternative and presumptively inferior
42. The perverse incentives created by excessive damage awards explains why punitive damages
are not typically awarded for breach of contract. See Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages,
56 S. CAL. L. REv. 79 (1982).
19891
The Yale Law Journal
form of credit arrangement or, at the margin, abandon the project alto-
gether. In this event, society as a whole will suffer because valuable in-
vestment opportunities are foregone.
D. Damages in Farah and K.M.C.
It is now possible to apply the above general principles to the discussion
of damages in Farah and K.M.C.
1. State National Bank of El Paso v. Farah Manufacturing Co.
In Farah, damages were calculated for the period between April 1, 1977
through March 31, 1978, the period during which the lenders' alleged
wrongfully threatened exercise of the management change clause pre-
vented Farah from returning as C.E.O. The jury found that FMC in-
curred losses of $2,668,000 during this period and lost profits of
$15,482,500 for total damages of approximately $18 million.43 Plaintiff's
expert caculated lost profits by comparing actual sales and profits from
1959-1975 and then projecting what sales and profits would have been
had Farah been in control during the damage period.""
The damage award of $18 million in Farah appears outrageous even if
it is (incorrectly) assumed that the lenders acted improperly in threatening
to exercise the management change clause. If FMC believed that Farah
would increase profitability by $18 million, all it had to do was renegoti-
ate its loan to delete the management change clause. Indeed, that is pre-
cisely what was done in April 1978 to facilitate Farah's return. Alterna-
tively, FMC could have negotiated a new loan with a different lender
without the management change clause and paid off the existing loan. By
not pursuing these options at the time the lenders threatened to exercise
the management change clause, FMC failed to mitigate damages. More
importantly, it demonstrated by its actions that it believed the "damages"
resulting from the threatened exercise of the management change clause
were less than the costs of renegotiation. The costs of renegotiation-the
cost of cover-should have been the maximum damages awarded.
This conclusion is not affected by the calculation of lost profits by the
plaintiff's expert or by the return of FMC to profitability when Farah
regained control in 1978. The calculation of lost profits by the plaintiff's
expert was meaningless. Any study that tries to forecast profitability for
the period 1976-77 by analyzing the profitability of sales from 1959-75
(even assuming this projection was done accurately) is inherently suspect.
This suspicion is particularly true under the facts of Farah. Recall that
FMC lost large sums from 1972-76 and this was why Farah was re-
43. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 669.
44. Id. at 679.
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placed as CEO and the lenders negotiated for the management change
clause. Any forecast should have focused on this more current and reliable
period. And, again, the best evidence that the expert's calculations were
meaningless is the behavior of FMC itself, which accepted the manage-
ment change clause and then made no attempt during the damage period
to renegotiate or secure alternative financing.
The return to profitability after Farah returned as C.E.O. in 1978 is
similarly irrelevant. This renewed profitability may be less attributable to
Farah's return than to, for instance, a favorable change in industry condi-
tions. But even if Farah were completely responsible, it still makes no
difference. A plaintiff should not be allowed to observe a breach, do noth-
ing and speculate on future events. The proper time to measure damages
is between the time of the breach and the time when the plaintiff had a
duty to mitigate. Any losses after this point could have been avoided if the
plaintiff had taken reasonable care by renegotiating or by obtaining alter-
native financing.
2. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.
The damage testimony and discussion of damages by the court in
K.M. C. are equally unpersuasive. There the jury concluded that K.M.C.
lost $7.5 million in lost profits as a result of the refusal by Irving to ad-
vance $800,000 in requested funds on March 1, 1982. The jury reached
this conclusion even though Irving advanced $700,000 of the $800,000 on
March 4, just 3 days later.45 Thus the jury apparently concluded that
K.M.C.'s value declined by $7.5 million as a result of a three-day delay in
funding.
The jury reached this conclusion based on testimony by two of plain-
tiff's experts, who testified that the value of K.M.C. to potential acquirors
was reduced by $10 million or more by Irving's refusal to advance the
$800,000 on March 1."" This testimony is inherently incredible. Why
should the value of K.M.C. fall by more than $10 million because of the
lack of availability of funds for three days? During this three day period,
K.M.C. had $800,000 less money but it also owed $800,000 less. The
failure to borrow money is a wash. There is no suggestion in the court's
opinion that some unique investment opportunity was lost to K.M.C. or
that some unique asset necessary to the continuation of the business was
lost during this three day period.
Absent such evidence of a lost unique economic opportunity, the dam-
ages consist of the loss of good will caused by the unavailability of funds
for a three day period. This amount is likely to be trivial, particularly for
a firm like K.M.C. which was already highly leveraged and in financial
45. KM.C., 757 F.2d at 762.
46. Id. at 763-66.
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distress: If potential acquirors were interested in a firm with these charac-
teristics prior to March 1, there is no reason to believe that anything
would change because the lender failed to advance funds for three days.
At the very least, it is wholly implausible to conclude, as one of plaintiff's
experts did, that an acquiror would have paid $10 million on March 1
but nothing thereafter. 47 The trial court should have thrown out a verdict
based on such testimony.
Thus the analyses of damages by the courts in Farah and K.M.C. are
fundamentally flawed. An understanding of the economics of contract
damages would have led to a different result in both cases.
V. CONCLUSION
In recent years, the booming area of lender liability has dramatically
increased the exposure faced by lenders. The doctrines of liability and
damages that have evolved in the lender liability area, however, are fre-
quently based on a misunderstanding of basic economic principles. Once
these principles are understood, the exposure faced by lenders should radi-
cally decrease. The resulting incentive structure operating on lenders and
borrowers should promote efficient terms in loan contracts.
47. Id. at 765.
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